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Abstract 
The paper analyses critically the theoretical approaches which try to explain the emergence 
and growth of diversified firms. While the outstanding theory is still heavily based on non 
formal analysis, some recent contributions have introduced formalised models. It is argued 
that a further development of formal theories could be very important for a deeper 
understanding of the complex phenomenon of multimarket production. Moreover, formal 
models could be extremely useful in order to build some precise hypotheses to be tested in 
sound empirical works.    
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1.  Introduction 
 Most firms operate in more than one market: diversification strategies are well 
widespread in all countries and the fortunes of a relative small number of diversified 
companies have considerable repercussions on the economic activity of the home country 
and, if they go multinational, of the foreign countries as well. Several explanations of 
diversification have been put forward, but there have been very few attempts at developing 
formal theoretical treatments1.  
 The utility of formal models should be reflected in the possibility of obtaining some 
clear predictions to serve as a useful guide for empirical works on the emergence of 
diversification in the first place and on the effects on firms’ performance and market 
structure. This problem is particularly important in this area, since empirical works have 
been generally not well specified and unsuccessful to discriminate between the different 
views. 
 The few and somewhat recent formal models available will be discussed and 
contrasted with the main non-formal theoretical explanations which have been advanced 
for understanding the extent and the patterns of diversification strategies. The 
interrelationships between technology, firms’ strategic behaviour and the characteristics of 
the different industries provide a joint explanation for diversification and for the evolution 
of industry structure.  
 At the end of the analysis we should be able to improve our understanding of why 
firms diversify or dediversify. In particular, the work should highlight the efficiencies and 
inefficiencies deriving from alternative diversification strategies, as well as the effects the 
introduction of new technologies, the evolution of markets, or variations in firms’ 
competitive behaviour are likely to have on strategies, on performance and market 
structure. Section 2 reviews the traditional theories of diversification, and discusses some 
puzzles which are still open to different interpretations. Section 3 digs deeply into 
formalised models. Their utility for a deeper understanding of diversification strategies is 
emphasised in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
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2.  Non-Formal Theories of the Diversified Firm 
 Montgomery’s review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the causes and 
effects of diversification (1994) highlights three principal motivations behind the decision 
of a firm to undertake a multioutput production: 
 
 a) The resource (or efficiency) view 
 In the process of growth firms accumulate resources that can be potentially 
employed in several activities; when the core business of the firm cannot grow anymore, 
they can be used in new activities (Penrose, 1959). Examples of such assets are R&D and 
advertising investments, labour skills, managerial capabilities, know-how: they should be 
to a certain extent indivisible and have a nature of quasi-public inputs within the firm2. 
Moreover, there should be some obstacles, such as the presence of transaction costs, to 
their purchase or selling via the market mechanism, so that it appears convenient to 
internalise the new activities (Teece, 1980 and 1982). Each firm by activating some 
particular assets develops specific core competencies. The latter strengthen its position in 
the primary markets and lay the foundations for widening the range of goods to be 
manufactured (Collis and Montgomery, 1995). The choice between related and unrelated 
diversification is then linked to the relative specificity or generality of firms’ resources. In 
particular, the accumulated technological knowledge may be more or less suitable to be 
used for producing new goods. A localised knowledge limits the scope for diversification, 
while a more general technical competence may be consistent with broader diversification 
strategies. If the possibility to diversify depends on firms’ accumulated competencies, the 
above pattern of diversification is to a certain extent path-dependent and endogenously 
determined by the technological choices firms made at an earlier date (Antonelli, 1995; 
Teece et al.,1994; Patel and Pavitt, 1997). The two way relationship between resources and 
product diversification has been discussed by Wernerfelt (1984). In particular, while on the 
one side the availability of resources may push firms to enter new industries, on the other 
side firms which manufacture different goods may develop new resources. The latter may 
                                                                                                                                               
1   This explains why in traditional textbooks diversification is either ignored (Tirole, 1988) or superficially 
treated (Martin, 1993). 
2  However, Levy and Haber (1986) stressed that a diversified firm enjoys an advantage even if the 
input has not the characteristics of a joint asset. It is sufficient that it is sharable, i.e. “transferable 
between uses, but [which] may be used in producing only one output at a time” (p.293). 
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lay the foundations for new diversification waves towards industries where the link with 
the original set of firms’ resources may gradually disappear. Grandstrand (1998) digs into 
depth in the complex relationship between resource diversification and business 
diversification, with the aim of developing a theory of the technology based firm. 
 
 b) The agency view 
 In firms with ownership in the hands of shareholders and ruling power in the hands 
of managers, the latter may follow diversification oriented growth strategies in order to 
increase their power and prestige (Marris, 1964). Due to an information advantage, 
managers may maximise their own objectives without being too much constrained by the 
shareholders’ objectives (profit maximisation). Cash generated in the firms they rule can be 
used for entering new industries instead of being given to the shareholders (free cash flow 
hypothesis). Since they are generally more risk averse than shareholders and cannot reduce 
the risk by diversifying their work, managers may direct toward risk reducing conglomerate 
diversification (Ahimud and Lev, 1981, Mantell, 1998)3.  
 
 c) Market power view 
 Diversified firms may increase their market power by cross-subsidisation activities: 
a market strength in one particular industry may be used to sustain low price strategies in 
other industries with tougher competition (deep pocket). For the diversified firm it could be 
easier to undertake predatory strategies. First, diversified firms have higher internal sources 
of finance and can sustain a low price strategy for a long time (long purse story). Second, a 
predation in one market may be used to build a reputation which reduces the costs of 
predation in other markets (multimarket reputation). Levy (1989) added to these two cases 
the increased possibility for a diversified firm to transfer assets internally. This third 
property may render a diversified firm less vulnerable as a prey too. Hilke and Nelson 
(1988) contrast the latter statement by arguing that a firm which has the possibility to 
transfer assets to a new market should have a greater incentive to exit a predated market4. 
                                                 
3  In the absence of managerial motivations, there is no a risk reducing reason for diversification, as 
shareholders can diversify their portfolio of shares by investing in different companies. 
4  However, it is not clear why the firm has to exit a market if  there are good prospect of making future 
profits in it. Moreover, the authors do not explain why a profitable opportunity such as that of 
producing the new good has not been fully exploited before the predation. 
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 Another way to increase firms’ market power is the multimarket contact hypothesis 
(MMC) (Scott, 1993, Bernheim and Whinston, 1990), following which firms meeting in 
several markets have a greater incentive to devise and sustain collusive agreements. As we 
will discuss later in more detail, multimarket contact generates ex-post an incentive to 
collude. However, a firm enjoying a monopoly position in one market ex ante could find it 
more profitable not to enter another market already occupied by a monopolist. This is the 
genuine hypothesis of mutual forbearance which leads to the formation of ‘spheres of 
influence’ (Edwards, 1955) in which players recognise the supremacy of a particular firm 
in a market and concentrate their activities in other markets. 
  
 d) Institutional Motives 
 Recently, another motive for diversification emerged in the literature, even if its 
explanatory power is limited to cases in which there are significant policy distortions, such 
as in developing countries. Gemawhat and Khanna (1998) highlighted the role of such 
distortions, which may assume the form of specific tax codes, regulatory procedures, 
collusive practises with bureaucrats, in influencing the decision of a firm to operate in 
different markets. This diversification is then not driven by pure efficiency reasons, but it is 
motivated by the possibility to reach scope economies in rent seeking activities, as well as 
by the opportunities and the incentives given by the legal system of norms and procedures. 
When the country undergoes a transition towards a more competitive environment 
(liberalisation, deregulation), firms which diversify following this view are pushed towards 
return to the core strategies, and largely diversified business groups are not sustainable 
anymore5.   
 
2.1  Problems with traditional theories 
 The above theoretical motivations underline causes and effects of diversification 
which are not mutually exclusive, so it is not surprising that empirical works have found it 
difficult to differentiate among them. In particular, diversification strategies undertaken by 
growth-oriented managers may on the one side generate economies of scope and on the 
                                                 
5  However, Khanna and Palepu (1998) argue that this might not be the case in the absence of a parallel 
development of market intermediaries, such as the market for capital,  for labour, for financial 
activities, and so on. 
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other side increase firms’ market power. Similarly, efficiency driven diversification might 
create as a by product more multimarket contact with consequent more opportunities for 
collusion. However, it is possible to individualise some inconsistencies between them: 
- related versus conglomerate diversification: depending on the specificity of the 
resources to be employed, diversification might direct towards more or less related 
activities, but systematic conglomerate diversification is inconsistent with efficiency 
reasons, while it might be consistent with theories sub b), c) and d). Related 
diversification is also inconsistent with the risk reduction hypothesis, since similar 
activities are subject to similar shocks (Jovanovic, 1993)6; 
- relative share of secondary activities: in order for the market power motivation to 
be effective, firms’ market shares in the secondary markets should be relatively 
high;  
- performance: theories sub a) and c) are both consistent with good performance 
results, while the agency view can explain why diversified firms make less profits 
and have a lower market value. The discrimination between explanations a) and c) 
cannot rely on measures such as profits or price cost margins, as has been made in 
many past studies. Conversely, high prices are more appropriate to detect the 
presence of market power while higher productivity levels are closer to the resource 
view explanation. 
- mode of diversification: diversification via acquisition is more likely to reflect 
motivations sub b) and c) while diversification via internal growth is probably more 
linked to the exploitation of some firm specific assets. From a different perspective, 
a firm may have the total control of the new activities by establishing wholly owned 
subsidiaries, or it may look for the collaboration of other established firms by means 
of shared ownership agreements. Joint ventures, for example, are more likely to be 
formed in accordance with motivations sub a) and c). 
 When undertaking empirical analysis, we should keep into mind the above 
inconsistencies and exploit them in order to judge which theory is in the best position 
for explaining the empirical regularity which is being uncovered.  
                                                 
6  However, it has been argued that systematic or undiversifiable risk is lower for related diversifiers, 
since they can better respond to negative shocks (Montgomery and Singh, 1984, Lubatkin and 
Rogers, 1989). 
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 The agency view is a theory of disequilibrium in itself and has a positive appealing, 
but it is less useful as a theory investigating if and where firms should diversify. The 
market power explanation alone is not appealing as a cause of diversification but together 
with other explanations might be important to ‘complete the picture’ of what lie behind 
firms’ strategies. On the other side, the resource view seems persuasive as a normative 
theory of what firms should do, given particular technological and demand conditions and 
given the specific market structures of the industries in which they are operating.  
 
2.2  A recent puzzle: overdiversification and return to the core 
 There is a strand of literature which suggests that diversification might be ‘more 
loosely’ driven by imperfections in the capital markets or by managers’ ‘mistakes’. Both 
explanations have been used by Markides (1995) in interpreting the waves of 
diversification during the sixties and the seventies in the US and the refocusing strategies 
starting from the eighties. He suggested that each firm (again in an informal way) has an 
optimal level of diversification. The latter depends on its specific assets and on the 
capabilities of its managers on the one side, and on the characteristics of the economic 
environment, which gives opportunities and imposes constraints, on the other side. The 
optimal level may shift over time, according to variations in firm and market 
characteristics. It is possible that a firm is ‘overdiversified’ because managers 
overestimated their capabilities of running a wide range of activities (the ‘hubris 
hypothesis’). Similarly, overdiversification could be due to a stock market which was 
overestimating the value of diversified firms. When the stock market turns out to be more 
efficient in assessing firms’ strategies (Bhide, 1990) or when managers improve their 
learning of how to rule organisations, firms dediversify. While there is evidence that the 
stock market was reacting negatively to diversification strategies and positively to 
refocusing strategies in the 80’s (Morck et al., 1990; Comment and Jarrel, 1995; Daley et 
al, 1997; Lang and Stulz, 1994), Servaes (1996) found that diversified firms were 
destroying value only in the 60’s, but the valuation in the stock market of diversified and 
non diversified firms was not different in the 70’s. This suggests that managerial 
motivations can play a role for explaining why firms were diversifying in the 60’s 
notwithstanding these strategies were destroying value in the market, but it is not clear why 
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in the 70’s diversification was not destroying the value of the firm anymore7. However, 
contrary to Servaes (1996), Klein (1997) found that in a smaller sample of large 
conglomerates firms were positively valued in the sixties and negatively valued in the first 
70’s. 
 Together with firms which are refocusing at each period there are firms that are 
diversifying in order to reach their optimal level. Markides found that largely diversified 
firms were dediversifying by exiting marginal and unrelated activities while diversifying 
firms were entering related markets. Is return to the core voluntarily undertaken by firms or 
it is the result of an improvement in monitoring capabilities of the market for corporate 
control? Denis et al. (1997), Berger and Ofek (1995 and 1996), Baghat, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1990) present evidence for the latter explanation, finding that diversification was 
driven by market discipline events such as acquisition attempts, financial distress, etc.  
 
2.3  The conglomerate firm 
 Are conglomerate strategies, by pooling unrelated activities, always inconsistent 
with efficiency reasons? Contrary to this statement, Kay (1992 and 1997) argues that 
conglomerate firms are more sheltered against threats that are specific of a particular 
market or activity. Moreover, if there is soft selection in the environment and if firms are to 
a certain extent locked in their past strategies, conglomerate firms have no incentive to 
dediversify.  Williamson (1992) underlines the advantages for diversified firms to construct 
internally a miniature capital market. In fact a multidivisional firm (M-form), which can 
benefit from an information advantage with respect to subjects operating in the external 
capital markets, is more able to allocate resources towards the more profitable divisions. 
Another case in defence of conglomerate strategies is relative to firms which operate in 
emerging markets (Khanna and Palepu, 1997 and 1998). In fact, by operating in a range of 
industries firms may “imitate the functions of several institutions which are present only in 
advanced economies” and enjoy different benefits: they may build a reputation for quality 
products and services, which can be used to sell products unrelated to the core business; 
                                                 
7  The non negative market valuation in the seventies might explain why diversification increased 
significantly in that period: the conflict between managers and shareholders was less pronounced. In 
the 60’s, managers’ objectives seemed to  prevail while in the 80’s shareholders’ objectives seemed to 
induce less diversification and refocusing. 
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they can train their own workers with efficiency improvements; they can use their 
reputation for raising more easily and at a lower cost new capital.  
 However, following Teece et al. (1994), the conglomerate firm lacks competencies 
at the corporate level and is a transitional form which can survive just because of a weak 
external pressure. Similarly, Davies, Rondi and Sembenelli (1997) argue that an increase in 
the level of competition, such as the one driven by the European Integration, should 
stimulate each firm to concentrate on its core business.  Finally, Bhide (1990) insisted in 
the improvements in the efficiency of the external capital markets in determining the return 
to the core wave in the 80’s. It appears then that, far from being based on structural 
efficiency advantages, conglomerate strategies may be pursued due to the lack of 
competition, to the presence of underdeveloped financial markets, or the permanence and 
effectiveness of collusive behaviour. 
 
 2.4  The effects on applied works  
 This section contains the core of the traditional theoretical literature on 
diversification. Empirical studies in this area have found it difficult to specify hypotheses 
which unambiguously identify a particular theory. In some circumstances8 applied 
economists specify clearly that their results are open to different interpretations, while in 
most of the works this problem, while present, is not directly recognised by authors. The 
next paragraph focuses on formal models. As it will be argued, it is our opinion that their 
use can do a great job in overcoming some of the theoretical weaknesses individualised in 
the present section. Moreover, they can be extremely helpful for devising some precise 
hypotheses to be tested in sound empirical works. 
  
3.  Formal models 
 Having discussed the main theoretical contributions to the problem of 
diversification in broad terms, the attention will now focus more specifically on formal 
models and their predictions.  There is a great variety of models: some of them do not focus 
directly on diversification strategies, while others concentrate on very specific cases of 
multiproduct activity and can hardly be used for making inferences about diversification in 
                                                 
8  See, for example, Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988, p.631), Lang and Stulz (1994, p.1278), Scott 
(1989, p.44), Wilson (1992, p.179), Hughes and Oughton (1993,  p.220). 
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general. On the whole, however, we strongly believe that they are extremely useful for 
reducing the above theoretical gap. 
3.1.  Economies of scope and the efficiency advantages of diversified firms 
 Economies of scope (Panzar and Willig, 1981) measure “the cost advantage for 
firms of providing a large number of diversified products as against specialising in the 
production of a single output” (Bailey and Friedlander, 1982, p.1025) and provide a 
technological reason for the existence of multioutput firms. Cost advantages generally 
arise from i) a joint utilization of inputs for producing more goods (for example, a sheep 
from which it is possible to obtain wool and meat); ii) inputs which have to a certain 
extent the nature of public goods (such as human capital which is applicable for 
producing different outputs).  
Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) analyse theoretically costs in a multiproduct 
firm. First, a technology may exhibit multiproduct economies of scale (ray scale 
economies if the product mix does not change and product specific economies of scale 
if it changes). Second, it can incorporate economies of scope when the cost of 
producing goods 1 and 2 jointly is less than the costs of separate production: 
 
C(y1, y2) < C (y1, 0) + C (0, y2) 
 
Both product specific economies of scale and economies of scope contribute to 
determine the presence of ray economies of scale. If the effect of economies of scope is 
higher than the effect of product specific economies of scale the cost function is said to 
exhibit transray convexity9. 
 However, the fact that one input may efficiently be used for producing more 
goods does not mean that firms have necessarily to internalize all the productions. For 
example, it could be possible to sell the services of the input through the market. If one 
wants to explain the emergence of diversified firms, the argument based on economies 
of scope has to be reinforced by introducing some transaction costs which render the 
use of the market mechanism as relatively inefficient (Teece, 1980 and 1982).  
                                                 
9 Basically this property says that if we hold a weighted measure of the aggregate output constant, a 
diversified firms has always lower costs than the weighted costs incurred by the specialised firms. 
With two goods and weights a and (1-a): [a C(y1) + (1-a) C(y2)] > C [a y1 + (1-a) y2]. 
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The presence of economies of scope might explain why firms decide to 
undertake a multioutput production into related areas. While this theory is consistent 
with the resource view of diversification, it cannot account for the fact that some firms 
remain specialised, while other firms diversify. Moreover, firms often follow a 
sequential pattern of entry, while the presence of technological economies of scope 
would foresee the instantaneous production of the different goods. However, the basic 
ingredient of the presence of economies of scope has been introduced in several of the 
models which will be discussed in this section. 
 
3.2  Principal-agent and contract theories 
3.2.1  Moral hazard, self selection and risk aversion 
 Marshall et al (1983) examine the principal agent relationship between owners and 
rulers of the firm. Managers are assumed to be more risk averse than shareholders and try 
to limit the amount of the effort they have to exert. Shareholders have to give them 
appropriate incentives in order to obtain the desired level of effort. Since effort is not 
directly observable, incentive schemes are to be linked to the performance of the firm. 
Diversification towards non correlated or negatively correlated activities can be beneficial 
for two reasons. First, it is associated with a lower variance of returns, so that shareholders 
may monitor managers’ capabilities and effort in a better way. Second, managers may 
reduce their level of risk and obtain a less volatile outcome for a given level of effort. 
 Aron (1988) reaches similar conclusions in a slightly different context. Managers 
have skills and abilities that can be employed in more markets (not necessarily related). 
The ‘effective input’ of the manager depends on his talent (which is observable), his effort 
and on the capital invested on the firm. Shareholders choose the incentive contract and the 
amount of capital to invest. When the firm is diversified in two markets which are not 
perfectly correlated, shareholders benefit of two observations and may pay a lower 
incentive in order to induce managers to exert a particular level of effort, because the risk 
the latter face is reduced.  
 Taking these results together, there is a moral hazard explanation of why firms 
might undertake unrelated diversification, even if managers do not have a preference for 
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growth10. What should we expect if the managers hold equity interests (inside ownership) 
in the firm? Ahimud and Lev (1981) argue that managers should diversify to reduce their 
personal risk. Denis et al. (1997), analysed empirically this issue. They found that in the 
eighties the above incentive was important only for very large stakes, while small insider 
ownership was associated with reduced levels of diversification. We think that these results 
are consistent with Aron’s model. The moral hazard problem is in fact reduced when 
managers have direct stakes in the firm. Diversification may result to overcome the moral 
hazard problem (in this case shareholders’ interests prevail) or to reduce the risk of being 
stuck to a particular market (in this case managers’ interests prevail). At intermediate levels 
of managerial involvement, however, effort is guaranteed, and diversification might well be 
limited.  
 Rose (1997), building on the work of Hagerty and Siegel (1988), argues that it is 
not necessary to assume unobservable effort and moral hazard in order to consider the 
incentives for diversification. Diversification may emerge as well if incentive schemes are 
linked to the performance of the firm. When effort is observable moral hazard is not 
possible: nevertheless a diversified firm captures high skilled managers (self-selection) 
because it is more likely for them to obtain higher average outcomes, and in turn a higher 
compensation. Rose (1992) relaxed also the assumption of risk aversion on the part of 
managers as a condition for diversification. When manager’s behaviour is observed and 
managers are risk neutral diversification may still be optimal because of a new effect: the 
reduction of the likelihood of bankruptcy. When a firm is far from the event of bankruptcy, 
the expected returns from a given level of effort are high. Finally, Choi and Merville (1995) 
add to the principal agent scheme above the fact that diversified firms have to monitor the 
behaviour and the performance of their subsidiaries. The fact that managers of the parent 
company have to monitor over subordinates reduces the incentive to diversify into 
unrelated markets, in that the latter are more difficult to monitor as compared to related 
markets. 
 It appears clear that these models do a great job in correcting the principal 
argument advanced by the managerial view of diversification about the conflicting interests 
                                                 
10  While these models point to unrelated diversification, the genuine managerial view is not clear in 
differentiating between related and unrelated diversification. 
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of managers and shareholders, and the resulting diversification strategies followed by the 
former at the expense of the latter. 
  
3.2.2.  Efficiency of workers 
 From the analysis of the relationships between shareholders and managers, and 
between top managers and subordinate managers, the focus turns now to the interaction 
between managers and workers. Rotemberg and Saloner (1994) develop a model in which 
narrow business strategies (such as specialisation or a limited degree of related 
diversification) stimulate workers to undertake innovative activities. Workers may exert an 
effort level of d and come out with an innovative idea with a probability Q. If the idea is 
implemented they get a payment of k. The value of the idea is g in term of increased 
revenues for the firm (with gQ>d), and the employees will exert effort whenever kQ>d; the 
optimal incentive for them is to receive a payment of k=d/Q. Let us assume now that the 
same idea leads to two potential outcomes (increased revenues of g with probability Q’ and 
z with probability Q”, with g>z). The first best k=d/(Q’+Q’’) is achieved if i) z(Q’+Q”)≥d, 
that is when z (and g) is greater than k. If i) does not hold but ii) gQ’≥d holds, the worker 
put effort and receives k=d/Q’. The idea is implemented only if it gives returns equal to g 
(since g≥k but z<k)11. If both i) and ii) are not satisfied, workers do not exert effort at all.  
 The main point of the above model is the following: if ideas have more than one 
application it is more difficult for workers to be motivated. Rotemberg and Saloner apply 
their framework to the case in which firms manufacture two products. Let us assume that 
workers in activity i make innovations that can be only applied in i (with a value of j), 
while workers in activity j make innovations that can be applied in j with a value of g, but 
also in i with a value of z. They show how it is optimal to implement winning ideas in j also 
in i, with the consequence of supplanting better ideas (that is ideas with a higher absolute g 
value) developed in i. The result is that the incentive constraints (that is the necessity to 
reward workers for their innovative ideas) in the case of multioutput production might deter 
innovation in some activities. The firm finds it better to implement an inferior idea which 
costs relatively less than motivating the research for superior ideas. The authors 
demonstrate in this setting that two specialised firms can be more innovative and perform 
                                                 
11 In fact since i) does not hold z<d/(Q’+Q’’). Since k=d/Q’, z<d/(Q’+Q’’)<d/Q’=k. 
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better than a diversified firm. Innovative firms require narrowness while firms which are 
not innovative do not suffer from the above incentive problem and may be well diversified. 
They argue also that innovative firms might have higher accounting profits just because the 
ex-ante investments in innovative effort are not computed in the balance sheets. The 
accounting profits of imitative firms may on the other side be lower, but economic profits 
might be the same of innovative firms. 
 
3.3  Strategic motivations for diversification 
Diversification strategies may also be driven by strategic considerations. While 
economies of scope underline technological links between products, the presence of 
demand links renders output decisions even more interrelated. The several models 
treating multioutput production in a context of imperfect competitive markets are 
discussed in the subsections below. 
 
3.3.1 Economies of scope and the transmission effect in other markets 
 Bulow et al. (1985) consider the case of a monopolist in market i (firm A) operating 
also as a duopolist in market j. They show that changes in the conditions of market i could 
hurt the monopolist because of the  induced change in the rival’s (firm B) strategy in 
market j. Let us assume an increase in the demand for good i. The case of economies of 
scope and strategic substitutes is beneficial to firm A, while the case of diseconomies of 
scope and strategic substitutes is harmful. The opposite can be said if goods are strategic 
complements12. 
 With joint economies of scope an increase in the demand in market i implies an 
increase in the quantity sold in market j as well (because firm A’s marginal cost decreases). 
If goods are strategic substitutes this leads to a decrease in firm B’s marginal profitability, 
to the benefit of firm A. An increase in the quantity sold in market i is also affecting 
potential entrants in market j. If there are economies of scope marginal costs are reduced 
and firm A is in a stronger position, while the opposite happens if we allow for 
                                                 
12 A product is a strategic substitute if the marginal profit of firm B is decreasing in the strategic variable 
(price, output) chosen by firm A, so that a more aggressive play (low price, high output) by A lowers B’s 
profitability. A product is strategic complement if a more aggressive play of firm A is increasing the 
marginal profit of firm B. Quantities are generally considered as strategic substitutes and prices as 
strategic complements (Tirole, 1988).  
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diseconomies of scope. Since an increase in the demand in the primary market will benefit 
firm A’s relative position in the secondary market if there are economies of scope, both 
profits and the market share increase. It is not surprising then that the empirical literature 
has found it very difficult to discriminate between the market power and the efficiency 
explanations. 
 Bulow et al. deal with the mutual forbearance case too. Spheres of influence may 
occur just because it is optimal for a firm not to enter another monopolistic market, as far as 
the other firm has not entered its own market. On the other side multimarket contact may 
result just because it is optimal to enter after its own market has been invaded. If there are 
diseconomies of scope, for example, an expansion in another market renders the entering 
firm more vulnerable. Moreover the incumbent firm in the entered market will have a 
reduced quantity and so a greater incentive to enter the other market. The above example 
explains entry deterrence without introducing necessarily concepts such as tacit collusion 
and threat of retaliation. So, if firms can correctly foresee the consequences of their actions, 
with diseconomies of scope we should expect specialised production. However, in a 
repeated game context, Dixon (1994) showed how inefficient diversification can emerge 
due to the impossibility to coordinate towards the pareto optimal equilibrium. 
 
3.3.2 Competition intensity and economies of scope 
Instead of having a monopolist which also operates in a duopoly market, one can think of a 
situation in which a firm competes with a duopolist in market i and with another duopolist 
in market j. As compared to its two rivals, the multiproduct firm may enjoy a better 
position by exploiting economies of scope. This issue is explored by Cantos- Sanchez et al. 
(1998). In particular, the authors are interested in evaluating the effects of the transmission 
of competition intensity across markets. With respect to the situation of one multiproduct 
firm competing in two markets with two single product firms (concentrated structure), an 
alternative situation in which there are two duopoly markets with specialised firms 
(fragmented structure) is found to be characterised with lower total profits, lower consumer 
surplus and consequently lower welfare. This happens because in a concentrated structure 
the diversified firm may activate economies of scope, which benefit consumers 
notwithstanding the higher market share for the multiproduct firm and the lower level of 
profits for the single product firms. Moreover, in a concentrated structure the introduction 
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of more competition in one market may prove to be harmful for welfare. For example, 
when a single product firm prices at marginal cost (and behaves more competitively as 
compared to the previous Cournot game) it increases its market share to the damage of the 
diversified firm. The latter loses profits also in the other market, since the two markets are 
linked through the cost function. If economies of scope are very high, the welfare may be 
lower than the one occurring in the previous concentrated structure. The authors use their 
model to challenge two common beliefs: a) that a fragmented structure is better than a 
concentrated one; b) that the introduction of more competition in a concentrated structure is 
always welfare improving. 
 
3.3.3  Demand relationships 
 While Bulow et al. (1985) and Cantos-Sanchez et al (1998) are interested in the 
effects of economies or diseconomies of scope, Encaoua et al. (1986) concentrated on the 
demand relationships between products13. In particular, they compare a situation in which 
there are two markets and two single product duopolists in each of them, with a situation 
where only two diversified firms are present (they meet twice in the two markets). If 
products are demand complements diversification leads to higher quantities and lower price 
cost margins (PCMs). If goods are demand substitutes high prices can be charged and the 
PCM will be raised with multiproduct firms. The authors investigate the relationship 
between diversification and global market power as summarised by an aggregate Lerner 
index for the whole economy. Market power is increasing (decreasing) with diversification 
in the case of demand substitutes (complements). The relationship is not a causal one since 
diversification and market power are both determined by cost and demand conditions. If 
there are no links between demands, as with conglomerate diversification, the multiproduct 
strategy is not related to the aggregate Lerner index.  
 
3.3.4 Information asymmetries and signalling 
 Chen (1997) presents a model where firms enjoy private information about their 
costs and about the level of demand in their primary industry. By diversifying, and by 
                                                 
13 In the case of a diversified monopolist and a specialised duopolist discussed by Bulow et al. demand 
complements and strategic substitutes are increasing the marginal profitability of the monopolist. 
Complementarity in demand and economies of scope have then a similar effect. 
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choosing between related and unrelated diversification, they strategically deliver their 
private information. The latter can be used to gain market power with respect to rivals in an 
oligopolistic setting or to deter entry in a monopolistic framework. In a perfect capital 
market the author argues that a high demand in the primary industry implies that firms 
prefer to enter new markets by raising debt, while with a low demand firms find it optimal 
to raise equity14. Assuming that low costs in one market imply also low costs in other 
related markets and viceversa, low cost firms undertake related diversification through debt 
if demand is high or equity if demand is low. Unrelated diversification may be undertaken 
by high cost firms through equity if demand is low, conveying the information that the 
primary market is not attractive. Notwithstanding in  a world of perfect information related 
diversification is always better than unrelated diversification, Chen suggests a possible 
rationale behind conglomerate diversification in a world of imperfect information. He 
shows also that the signalling motivation may explain related diversification that otherwise 
is not attractive (when demand is very low). 
 This model has some clear predictions: 
- we should expect a aggressive behaviour in the primary market after related 
diversification but not after unrelated diversification (which is signalling high costs and 
low demand); 
- related diversification would predict higher profits than unrelated diversification; 
- without diversification and the inherent signalling advantage, single product firms 
cannot convey information on costs (or they may give the implicit information that they 
have high costs and that demand is high) and enjoy a lower market power.  
 
3.3.5  Entry into new markets and sequential diversification 
 Aron and Lazear (1990) analyse the problem of the introduction of new 
products. They argue that the latter are more likely to be introduced by new entrants or 
by non-dominant firms already present in the industry. This is because for dominant 
firms new lines may have negative repercussions on the sales of already existing 
products (cannibalisation), or because of the presence of diseconomies of scope. After 
                                                 
14 Chen maintains that for a firm with prospects of a low demand future profits are likely to be low: 
consequently it prefers new equity to new debt. While the cost of financing in the two alternatives is 
the same due to the presence of a perfect capital market, the choice of equity is signalling that demand 
is low. 
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the new product has been introduced, however, dominant firms imitate and start 
manufacturing it. 
 Deneffe (1993) provides another explanation of why established firms may enter 
a new market with a delay as compared to new entrants. The crucial feature here is the 
existence of cost externalities, both in the form of learning by doing (future marginal 
costs negatively correlated with actual values of production) and in the form of 
experience that may be transferred to new products (a typology of economies of scope 
that links actual volumes of good x to future marginal costs of good y). According to 
Deneffe’s model, firms may delay entry into a new market in order to build experience 
to reinforce their position in the primary market (experience effect) and to increase the 
competitiveness in the new market (relatedness effect). Non-diversified firms do not 
have the possibility to benefit of the above two effects and may enter early. An 
important feature of the above model is that it is able to explain by cost considerations 
why firms diversify sequentially. In fact, following the traditional economies of scope 
argument firms should produce a different set of goods from the start, that is they 
should be borne as diversified or specialised firms. 
 
3.3.6.  Strategic investments in R&D and in flexible technologies  
 Zhang and Zhang (1996) examine a firm’s incentive to invest in cost reducing 
R&D in a two stages multimarket duopoly context. In the first stage firm A invests in 
R&D and reduces the marginal costs of producing the good x, while in the second stage 
firms A and B play a Cournot game in markets x and y. The authors show that for good 
x the strategic effect of investing in R&D is stronger than in the single-output duopoly 
case. Moreover, a firm’s strategic decision in market x influences also market y. If there 
are economies of scope, firm A’s market share in industry y increases, while the 
opposite result occurs with diseconomies of scope. As to market x, an R&D investment 
increases firm A’s output independent of scope economies. 
 Roller and Tombak (1990) deal with the ex-ante incentives to invest in a flexible 
technology, as opposed to a less flexible (dedicated equipment) one. The former may be 
used for manufacturing two goods with interrelated demands. Their model shows how 
flexible technologies in the first stage are chosen by both firms (with resulting 
multimarket contact) if (i) markets are bigger; (ii) the difference in fixed costs between 
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the flexible and the dedicated equipment is low; (iii) products are not close substitutes 
(that is they are highly differentiated). 
 Dixon (1994) extends the previous model to the case of diseconomies of scope. 
Absent the possibility of collusion and provided that fixed costs of entering a new 
market are small enough, multimarket contact is endemic even if one allows for 
diseconomies of scope. According to his model, firms may direct towards flexible 
technologies even if dedicated technologies (that is technologies which are specific to a 
particular product) would have been more profitable. What drives this result is the fact 
that, even in the presence of diseconomies of scope, there is an incentive to enter a 
market not already entered by the rival. 
 Oliva and Batiz (1998) develop a model in which congeneric integration of 
firms emerges due to the effect of R&D synergies. Starting from two duopolies (4 
firms), the authors analyse the incentive for firms to engage in mergers and ending with 
a two market duopoly (2 firms). Conglomerate firms (merged firms in their model) have 
cost functions which benefit of synergies stemming from R&D spillovers (R&D 
expenditures borne for product q1 are reducing product q1*’s marginal cost, and 
similarly R&D efforts borne for developing product q1* are lowering q1’s marginal 
cost). However, there are costs to be borne to adopt and implement technologies, as 
well as to complete the merging operations. In their model economies of scope emerge 
when the cost savings due to R&D synergies are higher than the sum of the fixed costs 
of the merger and the implementation costs for technology adoption. The model shows 
that conglomeration (merger across markets) may result even if there are diseconomies 
of scope. On the other side, when there are economies of scope, there can be synergy 
traps in which firms merge but they earn less profits as compared to the profits which 
would have been granted had they remained independent. This is  the case when high 
synergies, while leading to the exploitation of economies of scope, are also determining 
and increase in the quantity and a decrease in the price. The final effect can be that of 
generating gross profits which are not sufficiently high to recover the fixed costs of the 
merger. While Dixon (1994) has shown that with diseconomies of scope inefficient 
diversification and multimarket contact may emerge, the results of this model suggest 
that, notwithstanding the presence of economies of scope, inefficient multimarket 
contact may emerge (with lower profits as compared to independent firms). As in Dixon 
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(1994), the option of remaining specialised is not available because of the incentive for 
firms to enter each other market (in this specific context by merging with the firm 
already operating in it) if they believe that the other firms will not enter.  
 
3.4  Repeated games and multimarket contact 
 It is well known that in oligopoly a collusive outcome is not sustainable if the game 
is not repeated and some punishment mechanisms devised and enforced. The multimarket 
contact hypothesis argues that it is easier to reach collusion when the same firms compete 
in more than one market, because the punishment strategy is more effective. If collusion is 
not sustainable in market i but is sustainable in market j, by operating in the latter it may be 
possible to reach the co-operative outcome in both markets. The equilibrium levels of 
quantities after collusion are such that each firm reduces its market share in the industry in 
which it was stronger and increases the share in the other industry15.  
 Bernheim and Whinston (1990) analyse the problem formally in a repeated game 
context, finding that with i) identical firms; ii) identical markets; iii) a constant returns to 
scale technology, the MMC is not important in enhancing collusive pricing (this is known 
as the irrelevance result). If collusion is not sustainable in market i and market j is 
identical, for example, it is not possible to use the higher potential for collusion in one 
market to win the resistance to collusion in the other market (pooling of incentive 
constraints).  
 Let us discuss the implications of differences between markets. Firms may operate 
simultaneously in rapidly growing markets and slowly growing markets because the higher 
potential of collusion in the former (due to higher losses of non co-operating in the future 
periods after a deviation) may counterbalance the low potential for collusion in the latter. 
Similarly, they can operate in markets in which a deviation is observed with a lag (or with a 
certain degree of uncertainty about its nature) by using the enforcement power from 
markets characterised with more observability and rapid responses. Finally, if there is 
uncertainty about the conditions of future demands (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986) by 
operating in markets that at present have a low level of demand firms may sustain collusion 
                                                 
15 Phillips and Mason (1992) confirmed this result in an experimental investigation. They found that 
conglomeration tends to reduce (increase) co-operation in markets where co-operation is relatively easy 
(difficult). 
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also in markets that at present have a high level of demand. Incidentally, this is another 
explanation of why firms may operate in markets with negatively correlated shocks 
different from the risk reduction hypothesis16. The previous examples were relative to the 
relaxation of the assumption of identical markets. If on the other side firms have cost 
asymmetries they may develop ‘spheres of influence’ in which each firm becomes more 
important (and at the limit produces only) in the market in which it is more efficient. The 
assumption of infinite repetition is not necessary in order to achieve collusion. Harrington 
(1986) showed in a context of a finitely repeated game that collusion may be sustainable in 
a multiproduct oligopoly by applying punishment strategies in every market after a 
deviation. If  there is more than one Nash equilibrium in market i (one of which is pareto 
dominating) and one Nash equilibria in market j (the Cournot-Nash one), for example, it is 
possible to sustain the co-operative outcome (which is not a Nash equilibrium in market j) 
in both markets with the threat to return to the inferior Nash equilibria after a deviation. Co-
operation can be maintained up to the last round17. 
 The simple observation that multimarket contact facilitates collusion is not however 
equivalent to saying that firms diversify in a similar range of industries in order to reach 
purposively collusive agreements, as has been sometimes maintained in some of the non-
formal literature. We have in fact discussed models in which MMC arises in the presence 
of economies of scope (Oliva and Batiz, 1998), or even in the presence of diseconomies of 
scope (Dixon, 1994), and this was the result of strategic interactions between firms, rather 
than attempts at reaching higher opportunities to collude. 
 Some scholars have tried to model the cross market reactions in standard static 
oligopoly models, through the help of conjectural variations parameters (Feinberg, 
1984, Hughes and Oughton, 1993). In particular, Hughes and Oughton (1993) extended 
the model by Encaoua et al (1986) in order to check for the possibility of collusion 
across markets. One result they found was that the negative effect of demand 
complementarity on PCMs could be outweighed by the presence of some degree of 
collusion. 
 
                                                 
16 We have already seen however that Aron’s model points to a non perfect correlation of returns, not 
necessarily to a negative one. 
17 In the last round it is not possible to be punished. Consequently, the collusive outcome, which is not a 
Nash equilibrium, is not sustainable anymore. 
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3.5  Asymmetries in efficiency 
 Bianco (1997) develops a model in which firms that are relatively inefficient in 
each single market can survive only with a multioutput production, by exploiting synergies 
between markets. There are two kinds of synergies: managerial capabilities that can be 
exploited in related markets (a manager is able to run two related activities in a similar way, 
so that a firm with high costs in market i has also high costs in market j, and viceversa) and 
economies relative to the characteristics of the goods (technological savings or benefits 
deriving from sharing common channels of distribution). In both cases specialised firms 
turn out to be those who are very efficient in one market but inefficient in the other market 
so that economies of scope (or managerial synergies) are not large enough to win the 
efficiency differential. Diversified firms may alternatively be very efficient or very 
inefficient in both markets. In the latter case diversified firms are less profitable than 
undiversified firms but this is due to technological and organisational conditions not to 
diversification per se. The common result in empirical studies that the market is valuing 
diversified firms less than specialised ones18 may be explained by asymmetries in the cost 
function between firms and not by value reducing diversification strategies undertaken by 
opportunistic managers. 
 Roller and Desgagne (1996) are not directly interested in explaining diversification 
but their model of multiproduct duopoly can be compared to the previous one. Here 
managers have limited capabilities and effort can be directed towards one or two goods. 
The higher the effort dedicated to good i (ti) the lower the effort remaining for good j (1- ti). 
If there are ex-ante asymmetries between two oligopolists (firms A and B) about the level 
of effort to put in good i (tiA≠ tiB) and if one allows for managerial resistance to change 
(organisational inertia), firm asymmetry is exacerbated ex-post. The fact that managers 
have limited capabilities implies that each firm should concentrate on the good for which it 
is relatively efficient (lower level of ti). However, in the presence of economies of scope or 
with the possibility to exploit managerial skills in more than one market (as in Bianco’s 
analysis), firm asymmetry may either be reduced or increased. This depends on the ability 
for the firm with relative inefficiency in good i to activate two productions. 
                                                 
18 This is generally done with a chop-shop approach, that is by considering the performance of the 
diversified firm and the average performance of a benchmark sample of firms which match by type 
and by size the industries in which the firm is active. 
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4.  An overall assessment 
 We are well aware that some of the models discussed in section 3 treat limited 
cases of diversification (private information on demand and costs, applicability of ideas to 
more than one product, etc.) while other have not been introduced to directly discuss 
diversification. Taken together, however, we think that they can give clearer predictions 
and more interesting insights than the ones coming from the non-formal literature reviewed 
in section 2. Some critical points are worthwhile to be summarised at this point: 
- Endogeneity: for many different models diversification strategies, the performance of 
diversified firms and the level of concentration are endogenously determined by 
technological conditions, by demand characteristics, by firms’ competitive behaviour; 
- Dynamics: dynamic changes in patterns of diversification may be linked to the fact that 
firms try to reach their equilibrium level of diversification, or that they shift towards a 
new equilibrium after changes in the external environment, or in the technology, or in 
the demand conditions, occur; 
- Related versus unrelated diversification: while most models assume or point towards 
related diversification, conglomerate diversification appears consistent only with 
principal agent motivations, with Chen’s model and with the multimarket contact theory 
(if the presence of diseconomies of scope is not counterbalancing the advantages of 
more collusion); 
- Asymmetries: according to the resource view, diversification should  be directed towards 
related industries and should be reflected in higher profits. However, if we observe 
opposite patterns, they are not necessarily evidence of the presence of the disequilibrium 
situations suggested by the traditional managerial explanation: asymmetries in 
efficiency (Bianco, 1996) or biased accounting procedures (Rotemberg and Saloner, 
1994), for example, might explain lower profits, while asymmetries in information 
between rivals (Chen, 1997) and inside the firm (Aron, 1988; Rose, 1997) might 
account for unrelated diversification. Asymmetries between demands or between firms' 
characteristics are also needed to overcome Bernheim and Winston (1990) irrelevance 
result and asymmetries in managerial capabilities are behind the model developed by 
Roller and Desgagne (1996) too.  
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5.  Conclusions 
 We started by highlighting that economists' efforts to explain diversification 
strategies have used mainly non formal theories, and that this has been reflected in not well 
specified empirical works. Some formal theoretical treatments, partially developed for 
reasons other than the analysis of diversification, emerged in the literature in the mid 
eighthies but i) they have not been developed or/and ii) they have been ignored in empirical 
studies. More recently, the exigence of using formal theoretical analysis seems to be 
acknowledged by a series of scholars (Bulow et al, Bernheim and Whinston, Chen, Bianco, 
Aron, Rotemberg and Saloner) who addressed diversification from different angles 
(oligopoly and other imperfect market models, repeated games, asymmetric information, 
principal agent theory, contract theory). We believe that this path is worth to be following. 
 The explanation of diversification is not an easy task. Each theory, amongst the 
ones available, may be successful in explaining at least some types of diversification, and 
different theories might be consistent with an observed pattern of diversification. However, 
this is not to say that all theories are equally important and that there is not room for 
differentiating among them.  
 In the empirical literature low profits of diversified firms have been associated with 
managerial motivations but the above analysis suggests that this might not be the case. 
Similarly, multimarket contact has been sometimes seen as a strategy purposively 
undertaken in order to increase collusion and profits (Scott, 1993). A deeper analysis 
suggests that MMC is more likely to be the result of strategic interactions between rivals. 
Starting with two single product monopolies, a high degree of tacit collusion ex ante is 
likely to result in specialised firms, according to the mutual forbearance hypothesis; a low 
degree of collusion ex ante on the other side is likely to give diversification and MMC ex 
post. Profits of specialised firms might be high due to collusion ex ante, while profits of 
diversified firms with MMC may be high with respect to diversified firms without MMC 
due to collusion ex post. In both cases, however, the key explanatory variable is collusion 
and not diversification. 
 Diversification has recently drawn an increasing attention because of the 
widespread phenomenon of refocusing or return to the core in the 80's, after the 
conglomerate waves of the 60's and 70's. The financial approach to diversification seems to 
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have been the only one addressing this phenomenon with a series of papers that focused on 
managerial mistakes and on imperfect and immature stock markets and markets for 
corporate control. We believe that the industrial organisation approach has something to 
say to this regard and might be used as an alternative or complementary explanation. 
Changes in the degree of competition and in the relative size and growth of markets might 
be responsible for diversification and dediversification patterns. This could be particularly 
relevant in Europe, where the completion of the Single Market seems to have stimulated 
firms to reorganise their multimarket and multicountry activities.  
 Other than being interesting per se, diversification patterns, as part of firms' 
strategies, have repercussions on the structure of industries. While most of the empirical 
literature focused on why firms may decide to diversify of dediversify and on the effects 
diversification is likely to have on firms’ performance, formal models have interesting  
implications for market structure too (monopolies with mutual forbearance, oligopolies 
with or without multimarket contact, concentrated versus fragmented structures). A better 
understanding of the reasons behind firms' conduct implies also a more complete analysis 
of the evolution of market structure. 
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